Discussion du Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies 16 mars 2007
Le 16 mars 2007, le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies a discuté du rapport de Mme Jody Williams (chef de la mission de Haut-niveau au Soudan) sur la situation au Darfour.
Présentation du rapport par Mme Williams
Ce rapport insiste sur la nécessité de protéger les civils. Mme Williams propose notamment de créer une force de protection dans ce but.
Jody Williams, Head of the high-level mission, presenting the report, said it described a pattern of counter-insurgency by the Government of Sudan together with Janjaweed/militia. The report also noted that rebel forces were guilty of abuses of human rights and violations of humanitarian law. Civilians were victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which continued across the region. Killing, rape, torture, arbitrary arrest, repression of political dissent, and abuses of political freedoms occurred with chilling frequency. Ineffective mechanisms of justice, the free flow of weapons, the absence of meaningful disarmament, and a climate of impunity had left the region a stranger to the rule of law.
Ms. Williams said critical needs for improving the situation of human rights in Darfur were numerous. Among the most pressing, the report identified enhanced protection for civilians, renewed progress toward sustainable peace, expanded humanitarian space, increased accountability for perpetrators, programmes to address root causes, serious efforts to ensure the implementation of existing recommendations from human rights bodies, and compensation for victims of human rights violations. Every State had the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. When a State was unable or unwilling to do so, it was the responsibility of the international community to take action to ensure effective protection.
L’échange de points de vues qui a suivi cette présentation montre que les Etats sont partagés entre le rejet et le support de ce rapport avec la question de sa légitimité.
Voici quelques réactions :
MOHAMED ALI ELMARDI
speaking as a concerned country, said the Council was set up as a substitute for the Commission in order to achieve certain objectives, such as moving away from politicisation, selectivity and double standards. Today, unfortunately, they had witnessed a conspiracy against Sudan for political objectives. The unjust report, made up by five persons who had visited a country other than Sudan to decide on issues about Sudan, was not impartial, and they had gone beyond their mission, which was to assess the situation of human rights in Sudan, and not from outside, and to assess the needs of Sudan, and not to assess those needs from another country. In the past period, Sudan had showed unprecedented cooperation and flexibility, believing this would be enough to help the international community, as represented by the Council, to help Sudan to achieve peace and stability. Instead, today there were only negative indications about those who were fighting the central Government, destroying Governmental facilities and infrastructure, killing people, and destroying development and services of the country. These were the people who were rewarded by the report.
The people of Sudan and the African Group had commended the Abuja Peace Agreement, and called on those who had not signed it to do so, threatening sanctions if they did not. Since then, the international community had been totally silent - no measures whatsoever were taken against those who were carrying arms and combating the legitimate Government. There were continuing reports of 200,000 people killed in Darfur, and the number had remained the same for three and a half years. If it were true, then the figure should have increased. However, this exaggerated number had remained unchanged. This meant the situation in Darfur was improving. The mission could have seen for itself that the situation in Darfur was much better than ever before. Sudan had not in any way refused to grant the mission visas : it said it had a reservation about one member, who had previously made declarations about his opinions, before being appointed, and had condemned Sudan before the mission began. The mission was clearly pre-written, and would be of no use for achieving peace in Darfur. The Council could not achieve its function if it were not fair and just. The report should be excluded, as it had no legitimacy and legal standing. It was faulty, and should not be discussed in the Council, nor adopted, as it was of no use. The Head of the Mission appointed by her own decision a body or took on herself something that was not in the mandate of the Council, namely the proposal of sanctions.
L’Allemagne au nom de l’Union Européenne
said it had not been easy to reach consensus on the high-level mission, but they had and the Government of Sudan had supported the decision. However, the Sudanese Government did not cooperate with the mission. The mission was unable to visit Darfur, and one member resigned, but the legitimacy of the mission was not the problem. It fulfilled its task and now the Human Rights Council must act on the basis of the recommendations of the report. Human rights violations by Government forces and rebel groups included sexual violence, forced recruitment of children, and internally displaced persons. The Council had to initiate concrete measures to protect human rights in Darfur and to seize the opportunity both for the sake of the people of Sudan and the credibility of the Council.
L’algérie au nom de la Ligue des Etats Arabes
the League of Arab States was not commenting on the substance of document A/HCR/4/80 because it did not consider that the document had the requisite legitimacy. This was because of the following reasons : the high-level mission was finally not composed of the five qualified persons, and one of the persons appointed was the subject of legitimate suspicion for having already taken publicly a stand against the Government of Sudan. The League of Arab States felt that these facts constituted grave flaws, which affected the legitimacy of the said document. Such difficulties should have led the mission to defer its departure, and not seek from the Council to go to Ethiopia and to Chad, which it had not been asked to travel to. In addition, the Council should take a position on the fact that the proper theme of the mission should not be to investigate with respect to Darfur the degree of application of the responsibility to protect principle ; rather it should be the dual objective and reliable information assessing both the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of Sudan. The high-level mission by persons, who, contrary to relevant mandate-holders, did not have up-to-date first-hand knowledge of areas of human rights assessment entrusted to them, must rely to a greater extent on direct access to these areas. The acceptance by Sudan and by the groups to which it belonged including the Arab Group to co-sponsor the request for the special session, which had led to the endorsement of both Sudan and the regional groups of the final decision of the special session, had been a refreshing change from the past stonewalling pf previous special sessions. The way that this situation was dealt with constituted a momentous precedent for the future at a time when the Council was engaged in institution building. This Council needed to encourage, not sanction, expressions of good will addressed through dialogue and cooperation as mandated by the General-Assembly resolution 60/251.
said during the special session, the Member States of the Council agreed to recognise the gravity of the humanitarian situation and of human rights in Darfur, and decided to send a mission. The President of Sudan took it upon himself to cooperate fully with the mission. It was greatly regrettable that this agreement to cooperate had no effect ; it was not understandable, nor was it acceptable. It was hoped that in future Sudan would live up to the agreements that it undertook. The mission had returned a report of high quality. The evaluation confirmed all fears, and revealed urgent needs. The civil population was a victim of numerous murderous attacks. The rebels, as well as the Governmental forces and the militia they supported, bore the responsibility for these.
The entire world knew that crimes among the worst had been orchestrated with the implication of the Sudanese authorities. Those who were largely responsible for these crimes had not been brought to justice, due to the climate of impunity which prevailed, and the refusal of the Government to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. It was the primary responsibility of the Government of Sudan to protect the civil population. The Government should agree to the deployment of an international force to Darfur according to the three-phase approach suggested by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006. The deployment of this force was urgent. Secondly, the Government of Sudan should fully cooperate with the Council and all United Nations mechanisms. The Council should ensure the implementation of the numerous recommendations that had been formulated by the different pertinent bodies and mechanisms for the protection of human rights since the beginning of the Darfur conflict in order to put an end to these violations.
said China associated itself with the statement made on behalf of the Asian Group and understood the decision of the Ambassador of Indonesia to resign from the Mission. Owing to the resignation and problems of constitution, the mission that was nominated did not properly exist, and it had failed to make a visit on site. The mission’s objectivity, authenticity, and accuracy were called into question. The mission had no legal status. The mandate had not been implemented. The efforts to make the mission a consensus-driven initiative was applauded, but it was deplored that the technical matter of the composition of the mission could not be agreed.